Only three weeks after the events of September 11 th 2001, Aaron SorkinÕs ÔThe West WingÕ delivered a special one off episode, outside of usual storylines. The episode, titled ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ, is interesting because it adopts an explicitly pedagogical theme to teach viewers how to think about the event of 9-11. The episode can thus be read as an instance in the wider construction of the meaning of those events. In this respect, this article argues that the production of the episode contributed to notions of rupture and exceptionalism. In addition, despite the potentially ÔliberalÕ and ÔacademicÕ lessons given by the showÕs stars, the extensive contextualisation of the previously incomprehensible events for a dominantly American audience actually relayed, amplified and reinforced the emerging dominant discourses of the Bush Administration. Accepting and repeating official tropes, The West Wing ultimately served to further limit space for debate in the wake of 9-11.
Introduction
On October 3 rd 2001, three weeks after the events of September 11 th , episode 0 series 3 of NBCÕs The West Wing aired in the United States. Attempting to confront the events of September 11 th head on, this episode was remarkable in a number of ways. First, the showÕs creator, Aaron Sorkin, deemed it necessary to produce an episode (the only episode ever) that did not follow the ongoing plotlines of the popular series. Interpreted as an exceptional event and moment of temporal rupture, The West Wing responded to 9-11 with an exceptional episode and a temporal rupture of their own. Second, having been produced in only two weeks and written in only two or three days, the episode presented a Ôformidable logistical challenge for the directors, editors and castÕ, who were left Ôscrambling to meet a virtually unprecedented production scheduleÕ.
2 Third, the speed of this televisual ÔresponseÕ to the events in New York, Virginia and Pennsylvania ensured that it Ôwas the first TV show to address the events and aftermath of 9/11Õ.
3 Fourth, the West Wing achieved extremely high viewing figures of approximately twenty-eight million (an 18/26 rating/share), ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ received the showÕs highest ever viewing figures and was the most watched programme in the United States that week. 4 Fifth, the show was met with a generally polarised critical and popular reception. While some noted that it felt like Ôop-edÕ TV and others found it ÔpreachyÕ, these readings of the one-off ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ episode were in the minority amongst the general public, with most reviews voicing positive readings and warm approval for the showÕs attempt to tackle the issue dominating US politics and society at the time. 5 Approximately forty per cent found the show sufficiently engaging to afford it the highest possible ratings, awarding ten stars out of ten, with the episode declared a ÔWing-ed VictoryÕ despite some critics arguing that Sorkin had Ôwimped out on terrorÕ. 6 In general, reviewers found the episode to be Ôvery informativeÕ and helpful in Ôclarifying issues after 9-11Õ. 7 ÔI loved this episode coz I think it wonderfully manages to walk the fine line of honouring the events of 9/11 while still reasonably and calmly talking about what happened and why. A very educated and informative episode!Õ 8 Against this background, the episode arguably offers Ôthe perfect example of knowledge transfer and emancipative anti-racist educationÕ. 9 Mining traditional liberal themes of cosmopolitanism and understanding, the episode represents an attempt to forge a broadly Ôliberal responseÕ to the events of 9-11 at a time when these alternative voices had generally fallen silent. 10 This article argues that far from offering distinct interpretations, framings and responses to September 11 th , ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ instead helped to reinforce official emerging narratives and invalidate alternatives. In this respect, understanding both the production and reception of ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ requires that the episode be Ôre-contextualisedÕ within the post 9-11 moment, characterised by an initial Ôvoid in meaningÕ and a subsequent construction of crisis of which ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ was ultimately a part.
11 Placed back into this tumultuous moment, it becomes apparent that the purportedly Ôliberal responseÕ articulated in ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ is limited and limiting. No fewer than sixteen dominant tropes are invoked, the most significant twelve of which are discussed here. These tropes gave credence to official narratives and narrowed the space for debate in the wake of 9-11. ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ ultimately served to reinforce the Bush AdministrationÕs response to the events of September 11 th , simultaneously helping to silence dissent along the way. In this, sadly, The West Wing was typical of the broader ÔliberalÕ response to 9-11. 12 As a powerful, popular and emotive television series, The West Wing was able to make important contributions to political (im)possibility. Powerful entertainment programmes have the ability to widen the space for debate and challenge dominant orthodoxies. In light of this recognition, it is particularly noteworthy that ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ contributed to a narrowing of political dialogue after 9-11. In ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ, The West Wing reflected (and arguably helped to drive) calls for a more muscular liberalism in the realm of foreign policy after September 11 th 2001. 13
Context: Filling the Post 9-11 Discursive Void
Temporality was and has been of crucial significance to making sense of the events of September 11 th 2001. Notwithstanding clichŽd narratives of Ônight falling on a different worldÕ and 9-11 as Ôthe day the world changedÕ, it is apparent that for the majority of United States citizens the events clearly marked and heralded a moment of temporal rupture.
14 Transformed into passive ÔviewersÕ, Americans struggled to make sense of the unfolding events as they seemed to contradict the existing truths of US security culture and few authorised voices were forthcoming in explaining the situation to a bewildered public. As I have argued elsewhere, the wrong (the disproving of perceived security truths) and the lack (the failure to narrate) were the twin arms of the void that held Americans in a stunned, silent embrace.
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On the first arm, American security culture had long promulgated myths of invulnerability and invincibility. Although peaking in the Ôunipolar momentÕ of the 1990s, with declarations of the Ôend of historyÕ, the popular image of being separated from the dangers and corruption of the rest of the world was an enduring myth in American politics and society. 16 Tracing to the Monroe Doctrine and beyond, Americans had long considered themselves blessed by God with the protection of two vast oceans. 17 The events of September 11 th took place against this predominant understanding of AmericaÕs blessed geography and were subsequently met with spatial and temporal distanciation. Events were frequently denied and disregarded as either news from some other country or from some previous time; Americans struggled to accept that the events were happening ÔnowÕ and they were happening ÔhereÕ.
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On the second arm, the incomprehensibility of (what would later become) Ô9-11Õ arose due to the difficulty, and often impossibility, of subsuming the events within existing frameworks of intelligibility. The events of September 11 th were ÔunspeakableÕ as Americans lacked an appropriate language to describe what they were seeing. 19 Unlike, for example, British, Spanish or Sri Lankan experiences, Americans lacked a language for the illegitimate use of large-scale, external violence on domestic soil. 20 The lack of an appropriate language to make sense of 9-11 meant that cues were frequently taken from unofficial sources and ÔlowerÕ levels of cultural life. Religion and films were frequently drawn upon as initial American attempts to comprehend 9-11 took place at the level of the individual in contrast to the more commonplace intersubjective understandings that are produced through discursive regularities. 21 The resulting discursive void Ð as a lack of shared meaning regulated by an overarching narrative Ð saw a plethora of competing and fragmentary understandings in place of more commonplace harmonised meaning. In short, the cultural shock of 9-11 was compounded by the emptiness of the space usually occupied by assured ÔofficialÕ voices.
These twin arms Ð the wrong and the lack Ð then represent an inability to comprehend and an inability to articulate. If discursive failure is symptomatic of what Campbell has termed the Ôvoid in meaningÕ, it is the cultural shock that is symptomatic of what Edkins has termed ÔtraumaÕ.
22 Succinctly, 9-11 invalidated notions of anarchy, chaos and danger existing only beyond the borders of the United States. Falling outside of expected and predictable patterns of politics and everyday life, 9-11 was a traumatic event in that it was seen to demand a response. The insistence on a response outside of usual politics reflected the reading and experience of 9-11 as having occurred beyond politics-as-usual. It was this demand Ð even yearning Ð to be communicated and to ÔreplyÕ that generated such acute tension, as the void was marked by the very difficulty of communicating what had happened for the public. It was in this tension that President Bush had begun to articulate an official response and Aaron Sorkin wrote, directed and produced ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ, outside of The West Wing continuity.
The West Wing
The West Wing first aired on NBC in September 1999, going on to run over seven series. The show drew high audiences Ð the finale of series two attracted over twenty million viewers in the United States Ð and was critically acclaimed, winning three Golden Globes and twenty-seven Emmy Awards. 23 Although the showÕs creators, including Sorkin, were adamant that they were creating a work of fiction, numerous real-world parallels were evident from the start. Mockingly referred to by the American Right as ÔThe Left WingÕ, these parallels were initially most evident with the Clinton White House. 24 Waxman noted the ease of reading key characters as counterparts of Clinton Administration officials: Sam Seaborn as George Stephanopoulis; Josh Lyman as Paul Begala; and C.J. Cregg as Dee Dee Myers. 25 Along with numerous other real life politicians and practitioners, Dee Dee Myers actually served as a consultant for the show. And throughout the seven series, the show frequently dealt with issues paralleling those that had faced the previous Clinton Administration or that continued to challenge the Bush White House.
The showÕs liberal leanings and optimistic outlook meant that reviews were not always positive. The West Wing was mocked in the Weekly Standard and Atlantic Monthly as Ônothing more or less than political pornography for liberalsÕ, the Ôultimate Hollywood fantasy: the Clinton White House without ClintonÕ and naively ÔCapra-esqueÕ Ôpseudo-politicsÕ. 26 With a Ôtacit mission of the revival of lagging liberal spiritsÕ, right-leaning critics were aware that The West Wing was no more than a Ôcultural platform for the revival of liberal politics in AmericaÕ. 27 While that may have been true, it was clearly nonetheless a platform that even the most sceptical critics took seriously, as evidenced by the perceived need to comment on and ridicule the popular show. And after 9-11 it was a platform that would be used to give voice to a largely non-existent Ôliberal responseÕ to terrorism. That response came in the form of ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ.
Isaac and Ishmael
The choice of title is itself interesting and revealing. As elaborated in the episode, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ refers to a contested interpretation of the story of Abraham. The West Wing chose to emphasise that Ôwhat most people find important to remember is, in the end, the two sonsÕ, Isaac and Ishmael, Ôcame togetherÕ. This emphasis on unity and Ôcoming togetherÕ through the analogy of a story contested in Christian, Jewish and Islamic thought was largely welcomed in the United States and mirrored President BushÕs own repeated appeals for national unity. The choice of title does, however, indicate a reading and framing of September 11 th through a religious lens rather than a political one. Religious metaphors risked constructing a particularly intractable problem and de-politicising the events of of threat and fear. 29 Through this storyline Americans were reminded that the perpetrators of the September 11 th attacks were nineteen fanatical individuals and therefore, in post 9-11 America, there is no possibility of ÔreadingÕ threat from ethnicity or religious affiliation. If this first story is simplistic to the point of being blunt, it is in marked contrast to the parallel second story which attempts to capitalise on the showÕs cast in their positions as authorised experts, capable of articulating and explaining events which had thus far left AmericaÕs Ôbrightest and bestÕ baffled. It is also in direct contestation with the second imagining and construction of the enemy that the show offers. Just as in the official language of the Bush AdministrationÕs response to 9-11, the show presented a tension between understandings of the perpetrators as a group of radical individuals and an organised, omnipresent and threatening Islamic enemy. 30 And just like the Bush Administration, the show struggled to sell the former, whilst delivering an exceptionally resonant lesson on the latter. 31 If the former encourages a response to 9-11 oriented around a constant refusal to stereotype and a need to confront prejudice, the latter is central to maintaining support for a ÔWar on TerrorÕ; indeed, the latter naturalises a response of militaristic interventionism.
The format for the second story, in which this second imagining of the enemy is delivered, is in itself noteworthy. A group of school pupils who have been selected for the ÔPresidential ClassroomÕ scheme are stuck in the White House Mess Hall due to the lockdown. Starting with Josh Lyman, the White House Deputy Chief of Staff, the showÕs main characters oneby-one join the group to contribute to a question-and-answer based ÔlessonÕ on terrorism. Before moving to consider the answers the show gives, it is important to note two points. First, the show has afforded the time to ask questions.
I felt it was appropriate to just take a week and stop ... I was thinking 'Gee, I've really got to stop and pause and take a moment.
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Executive Producer John Wells recognised in ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ both the need to respond and the need to acknowledge the exceptional nature and temporal rupture that 9-11 wrought.
ÔObviously, everybody in entertainment and series TV have been trying to figure out what's the appropriate response, such as what needs to be said on ÔWest WingÕ ... We didn't feel comfortable going back to our fictional White House without taking a moment. Hopefully, we can say something that's useful ... Hopefully, it will make people talk and thinkÕ.
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The experience of 9-11 as a traumatic event Ð as a moment of rupture, outside of normality Ð was recognised in the production of ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ as a stand-alone episode. Second, the decision to frame the episode around knowledgeable, but scared and confused children asking questions was recognition of the voiceless-ness of the post 9-11 void. Language, Politics, and 9/11. (London: Routledge, 2002) . 32 Sorkin, ÔInterviewÕ. 33 John Wells cited in Josef Adalian and Michael Schneider, "Plots are hot spots for nets", Daily Variety, September 23, 2001. of September 11 th 2001, questions such as Ôwhy do they hate usÕ were commonplace. 34 With the American public symbolically embodied in school children asking questions about who are terrorists and why do they act this way, Sorkin acknowledges and actively reproduces the discursive void in meaning that 9-11 induced. Crucially, the episode also acknowledges and reproduces the phase of the War on Terror that would follow. Despite attempting an informed liberal response to terrorism, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ perpetuates the construction of 9-11 as a crisis through the (re)production of a number of dominant tropes that were beginning to define events and fix an increasingly hegemonic meaning to 9-11. Therefore, not only does The West Wing actively reinforce the cultural shock and voicelessness that characterised the initial post 9-11 void, but moreover ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ also reaffirms the later construction on 9-11 as a moment and marker of crisis by repeating, amplifying and contextualising the official narration of the events offered by the Bush Administration. To this end, The West Wing supported the official response to 9-11, helping to both further increase the resonance of dominant official narratives and silence dissent by demonstrating the apparent convergence of liberal and conservative responses to terrorism.
Amplifying Dominant Narratives: The West Wing and 9-11
ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ, despite attempting a considered and informative Ôliberal responseÕ to terrorism, reinforced a number of the key tropes that were central to the success of Bush Administration policies at the start of the ÔWar on TerrorÕ. These tropes and narratives can be grouped into three main themes, based on the central questions they answer: (i) who are the terrorists and what do they want? (ii) What is going on and how should the United States respond? And (iii) what should we do, as citizens?
Who are the terrorists and what do they want?
On the first question Ð who are the terrorists and what do they want? Ð the showÕs stars delivered five compelling answers to educate both the fictional pupils and the real world American citizens they represented. First, viewers were reminded that terrorists do want to kill American citizens. Well... it's not everybody, and they're trying to kill you, too.
In the days and weeks after 9-11, the Bush Administration relied upon the omnipresent threat of terrorist attack to pass far-reaching counter-terrorism legislation at home and launch a ÔWar on TerrorÕ abroad. This climate of fear was intense and widespread. For instance, despite later revelations of so-called Ôhome grown terrorÕ, events such as the 2001 Anthrax Attacks were readily interpreted as simply the latest instances and confirmation of an unfolding War on Terror. This was, for example, in evidence as Ôwhite powder scaresÕ were read through the lens of an emerging and solidifying ÔWar on TerrorÕ discourse. After one such evacuation, many miles from the sites of 9-11, comments included Ôwe could see it from the inside É the war reached hereÕ. 35 In its early stages, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ contributed to this tendency to read events through narratives of ÔterrorÕ and the unease they generated, before moving to address resultant fears. Thus, second, Americans were assured that despite wanting to kill them, terrorists always fail. This contextualisation of the unnamed Al Qaeda helped to explain the terrorist network to the population in a way that the Bush Administration had been struggling to achieve.
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Eventually and inevitably, the Bush Administration would draw upon the usual reference points Ð National Socialism and Communism Ð still synonymous with evil in American political culture. Addressing Congress, Bush warned Americans that Ô[t]housands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warningÕ, but that this terrorist evil would go the way of those other evils America had previously faced down. 38 However, in the first few days and weeks after 9-11, the Bush Administration faced the difficult task of articulating this ÔnewÕ and ÔunprecedentedÕ enemy that would inevitably be defeated. Repeated references to terrorists hating freedom, hiding in caves and being evil were made (e.g. This analogy also reinforced the perceived illegitimacy of moral equivalencies being drawn as Josh stated that because they Ôare not blowing stuff upÕ the Christian Right cannot be the correct answer. Again, the Bush Administration were at pains in the days after 9-11 to invalidate moral equivalencies being drawn between American foreign policy and terrorist actions, as well as Christian evangelical groups and Islamic fundamentalism. 40 In both of these tasks, The West Wing helped to reinforce and sustain the efforts of the Bush Administration, further narrowing the space for debate and chances of alternative framings in the post 9-11 moment. Deeming questions of imperial blowback and Christian or Western hypocrisy off limits, the Bush Administration was aided and abetted by the cast of The West Wing, who ensured Americans knew that fellow citizens and their nationÕs foreign policy were not to blame.
Fourth, The West Wing confirmed that even if terrorists do have grievances with US foreign policy they cannot possibly be justified. Thus, despite offering a partial counter-reading that was generally placed off-limits by official narratives, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ confirms that terrorists target the United States because of American identity and values. Like the Bush Administration, The West Wing reassured Americans that they were attacked Ôbecause we are the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the worldÕ, but that they should not worry because Ôno one will keep that light from shiningÕ. 
What is going on and how should the United States respond?
Having answered the first question, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ broaches a second, addressing the broader situation: ÔWhat is going on and how should the United States respond?Õ In response, the cast offers three important and increasingly commonplace tropes. First, Josh reassures the pupils and the watching public that killing terrorists is acceptable:
Pupil: Do you favor the death penalty?
Josh: No.
Pupil: But you think we should kill these people?
Josh: You don't have the choices in a war that you do in a jury room. But I wish we didn't have to. I think death is too simple.
A liberal response then regrets having to kill AmericaÕs enemies, but acknowledges that the Ôlaw paradigmÕ does not apply here. For Josh, these were acts of war and it is necessary to switch to a Ôwar paradigmÕ to fight back and keep America safe. C.J. Cregg backs up this position in a discussion of civil liberties and security:
C.J.: Look, I talk civil liberties as seriously as anybody, okay? I've been to the dinners and we haven't even talked about free speech yet and somebody getting lynched by the patriotism police for voicing a minority opinion. That said, Tobus, we're going to have to do some stuff. We're going to have to tap some phones and we're going to have to partner with some people who are the lesser of evils. I'm sorry but terrorists don't have armies and navies. They don't have capitals. Some of these guys we're going to have to walk up to them and shoot them. Yeah, we can root terrorist nests but some of these guys aren't going to be taken by the 105th armoured tank division. Some of these guys are going to be taken by a busboy with a silencer. So it's time to give the intelligence agencies the money and the manpower they need. We don't hear about their successes. Guess what? The Soviets never crossed the Elbe. The North Koreans stayed behind the 38th parallel. During the Millennium? Not one incident. Do you think that's because the terrorists decided that'd be a good day to take off? Not much action that day?
For C.J. the liberty-security debate is a Ôno brainerÕ; faced with an existential terrorist threat, Americans should increase defence funding and widen the scope for intelligence officers to act. After 9-11, these are particularly significant arguments to make. On 26 th October 2001 the USA Patriot Act was passed, which established far-reaching legislation to enable controversial Ôcounter-terrorismÕ measures such as Ôroving wiretapsÕ, property searches and extended periods of detention for suspected terrorists. On 25 th November 2001 the Department of Homeland Security was established with a budget rising from $20 billion in 2002 to $40 billion the following year. 43 That C.J., as the showÕs most prominent female character, made these points is also noteworthy. In post 9-11 America, Ôsoccer momsÕ were seen to be a new and crucial political and electoral group. Previously Democratic, but now primarily concerned about their childrenÕs safety, this group were seen to represent the growing concerns of American women about the threat posed by terrorism. They were seen to favour strong anti-terrorism measures, at the expense of civil liberties, in order to pursue the Ôno brainerÕ of keeping American children safe. 44 As a result, Ôsoccer momsÕ were increasingly identified as Ôsecurity momsÕ. Thus, like the Bush Administration, The West Wing actively contributed to the birth of this psephological grouping by helping to construct ÔsecurityÕ as the new womenÕs issue. 45 Second, in answer to Ôhow should the United States respond?Õ the pupils are reassured that America has friends; and that coalition-building is American.
C.J.:
There's nothing more American than coalition building. The first thing John Wayne always did was put together a posse.
Of course, BushÕs assertion that Ôyou are either with us, or you are with the terroristsÕ attempted to force wavering or indifferent states to explicitly back the US-led response of a ÔWar on TerrorÕ. And at this particular moment, then Secretary of State Colin Powell was investing considerable political capital in attempts to court General MusharrafÕs Pakistan. That such efforts could be constructed and viewed as a quintessentially all American act of putting together posse was useful in light of the fact that such an act could equally (and relatively easily) be viewed as straightforward hypocrisy. As Daalder and Lindsay note, aid to Pakistan went from $9 million in the three years before 9-11 to $4.3 billion in the three years after the events of September 11 th 2001. 46 Welcoming Musharraf back into the international community, after designating Pakistan a pariah state following his military coup of 1999, could very easily have been framed as the logic of a narrow, amoral realpolitik, in which concerns for ÔfreedomÕ mattered very little. Third, the pupils are told why the US must take action in Afghanistan, by simply replacing BushÕs harbouring metaphor with that of ÔincubatorÕ. After Bush had argued, Ôwe will make no distinction between terrorists and the states who harbour themÕ, The West Wing confirmed the ineluctable link between terrorists and their host states. repeated news coverage of gang wars at home, Americans had already been exposed to arguments that such ÔwarsÕ were clearly in the national interest and for the greater good. It was an analogy that resonated as it contextualised the new threat for Americans by drawing on an old threat with which they were already familiar and used to fighting. As one reviewer of ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ noted, Ôwhile all the characters gave amazing performances, there were a few standouts. Charlie's comparison of terrorist camps and gangs was really well writtenÕ. 47 Ironically, for this reviewer, such articulations were useful in teaching Americans Ôwhat canÕt be learned in classroomsÕ. 
What should we do, as Citizens?
Informed of who the terrorists are, what they want and what America should do, the third major question that ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ asks is: ÔWhat should we do, as citizens?Õ The answer again takes three forms. First, the pupils learn that, as Americans, they should not worry (despite having begun the lesson by learning that terrorists want to kill them all), continue to put faith in their education and continue to believe in liberal values such as pluralism.
Josh: But listen, don't worry about all this right now. We got you covered. Worry about school. Worry about what you're gonna tell your parents when you break curfew. You're gonna meet guys, you're gonna meet girls... Learn things. Be good to each other. Read the newspapers, go to the movies, go to a party. Read a book. In the meantime, remember pluralism. You want to get these people? I mean, you really want to reach in and kill them where they live? Keep accepting more than one idea. Makes 'em absolutely crazy.
All of this was, of course, supposedly the correct response because the government are responsible for and capable of keeping Americans safe; politics, terrorism and war should be left to the experts, citizens should uphold (liberal) American values and identity. To this end, The West Wing spoke in tandem with BushÕs insistence that ordinary Americans should Ôlive your lives and hug your childrenÕ. 49 And, while the liberal values advocated might not be shared with the Bush Administration, there were also clear parallels with official (neo)liberal calls to respond by continuing to shop as normal. 50 Through such calls, the official response of the Bush Administration and that offered by The West Wing constructed and reaffirmed an enabling and dangerous division between the personal and political. Second, despite the overtly Ôliberal responseÕ being put forward, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ confirms that it is normal to feel angry and to seek violent retribution. The West Wing gives voice to a common theme in American society during the post 9-11 void: the desire to realise the Jacksonian logic of the counter-punch. 51 In fusing love and anger, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ adopted a strikingly similar tone to BushÕs official announcements on terror.
Josh:
I'd put 'em in a small cell, and make them watch home movies of the birthdays and baptisms and weddings of every single person they killed, over and over, every day, for the rest of their lives [clears his throat]. And then they'd get punched in the mouth every night at bedtime. By a different person, every night. There'd be a long list of volunteers, but that's all right. We'll wait...
Third, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ closes on what was one of the defining juxtapositions in the official narrative of the response to 9-11 and a theme commonplace throughout American media and society. The fusing of American exceptionalism with individual acts of heroism Ð from fire fighters, the police and the passengers of United 93 in particular Ð was a recurrent theme in BushÕs speeches. 52 American exceptionalism Ð the belief that America is unique and superior Ð was central to American foreign policy in the response to 9-11, as it had been during the 1990s, Cold War and Second World War before. 53 What was unusual in American foreign policy after 9-11 was the degree to which these perceived national qualities were tied to the actions of individuals. For instance, not only was America attacked because of its exceptional nature (Ôwe are the brightest beacon of freedom in the worldÕ), but the attacks were also seen to bring out the best in America and encourage Ôeveryday acts of exceptionalismÕ in ordinary Americans. One frequently deployed strategy, was to contrast this exceptionalism Ð as manifest in the individual acts of heroism witnessed on 9-11 Ð with the cowardice of AmericaÕs enemies. The question of whether suicide bombers were ÔcowardlyÕ had been a politically charged topic in the shadow of the fall of the Twin Towers. 54 The West Wing correspondingly saved this topic for the showÕs close and the wise words of President Bartlett:
Boy 1: Well, don't you consider...I mean, I know they're our enemy, but don't you consider there's something noble about being a martyr?
Bartlett: A martyr would rather suffer death at the hands of an oppressor than renounce his beliefs. Killing yourself and innocent people to make a point is sick, twisted, brutal, dumb-ass murder. And let me leave you with this thought ... we don't need martyrs right now. We need heroes. A hero would die for his country but he'd much rather live for it... Juxtaposing American heroes and cowardly martyrs, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ closed once again by reinforcing and amplifying one of the key themes of the official response to 9-11. Just as Bush frequently brought Ôgood AmericansÕ and Ôevil terroristsÕ together in official narratives for maximum impact through juxtaposition, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ did likewise. Indeed, the tendency toward moral absolutes and American exceptionalism in The West Wing after 9-11 was so great, and the tendency for Presidents Bush and Bartlett to converge in narratives so frequent, that some analysts have dubbed SorkinÕs fictionalised but increasingly hybrid White House Ôthe Bushlet AdministrationÕ. 
Television and (Im)possibility
The possibility of the ÔWar on TerrorÕ was inevitably reliant upon Ôa background of social/discursive practices and meaningsÕ; such a background Ômakes possible the practices as well as the social actors themselvesÕ. 56 Understanding how the ÔWar on TerrorÕ came Ôto appear necessaryÕ and Ôthe only reasonable course of actionÕ, whereas alternatives were rendered ÔunthinkableÕ, requires an appreciation of Ôthe way in which power works to constitute particular modes of subjectivity and interpretive dispositionsÕ.
57 By helping to establish, what would become a largely agreed upon, background of discursive meanings, The West Wing through the ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ episode contributed to the possibility of the ÔWar on TerrorÕ and actively shut down the scope for debate in American politics and society after 9-11. Alternative voices were silenced by the amplification of official narratives. Of course, The West Wing was far from alone in this enterprise. Hayes and Guardino have noted that, in news coverage, ÔBush administration officials were the most frequently quoted sources, the voices of anti-war groups and opposition Democrats were barely audible, and the overall thrust of coverage favoured a pro-war perspectiveÕ.
58 And, after 9-11, the new context of the ÔWar on TerrorÕ was frequently reflected and re-affirmed in television shows such as MI-5/Spooks and 24.
59 What makes ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ noteworthy then is that the episode is explicitly written to respond to the events of 9-11 from a liberal perspective and it does so before any other entertainment television show of a similar nature. The show contributed to the rapid narrowing of the space from which alternative narratives could be put forward. The openness of the void, which was so quickly closed down, had initially enabled some alternative, critical and dissenting voices to be heard:
ÒItÕs not a surprise É No, itÕs not all that far-fetchedÓ.
ÒI think Bin Laden is basically a geniusÓ. ÒÉ all he [President Bush] uses are buzz words like evil, good, resolve and youÕd think he was talking about a Star Wars movie or somethingÓ.
ÒIt has nothing to do with freedom whatsoever É this might happen again so long as our policy towards the Middle East doesnÕt changeÓ.
ÒThe American people arenÕt thinkingÓ.
ÒI can sort of understand where Bin Laden is coming from É IÕm not necessarily proud to be an American É it will be a slightly longer version of the Oklahoma City bombingÓ.
56 Roxanne Doty, 'Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines ', International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 3 (1993) ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ contributed to the establishment of increasingly dominant discourses that marginalised these alternatives, acquiescing and co-opting potential oppositional voices. This can be seen not only in the rapid disappearance of alternative voices amongst the general public but also in overwhelming bipartisan support for Government policies after 9-11. The 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Terrorists was opposed with only one vote against (Democrat Congresswoman Barbara Lee) compared to the five hundred and eighteen supporting votes the resolution received from across party lines in both houses of Congress. In this context, The West Wing episode ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ can and should then be read as an important moment in the transition from void to crisis, as the meaning of 9-11 slowly harmonised across American society and the Bush Administration established a hegemonic foreign policy discourse that would come to underpin the subsequent ÔWar on TerrorÕ.
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In three principle and related ways, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ helped to make the ÔWar on TerrorÕ possible and to make alternative responses less likely. First, SorkinÕs script clearly placed the government at the centre of key relationships in a post 9-11 world. With government agency (and a monopoly on the use of violence) having been challenged so directly by the events of September 11 th , re-locating and re-concentrating agency at the heart of government was an important move for the Bush Administration. And it was aided by The West Wing. By positioning government officials as the only people who can understand and fight terrorists, simultaneously explaining events to the public and keeping them safe, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ places the Bush/Bartlett Administration as both the link and barrier between the public and terrorism. The ambiguity of this dual role ensures agency is located at the heart of government and citizens are reliant on elected officials for the information that guides security policy and the safety those policies supposedly bring. ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ encourages the role of government as judge, jury and executioner on the terrorist threat.
Second, this (re-)elevation of the government to a position of Ôsovereign protectorÕ through both knowledge and ability is reinforced by a ÔrecognitionÕ that the response to terror is particularly challenging and will require great minds. This is backed up by the fact that in ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ the showÕs stars are shown to be those minds teaching an informed but uncertain public. Third, the episode thus confirms that the role of the public is to listen to those government officials who are ÔexpertsÕ, have the knowledge of and the capability to respond to terror that they themselves lack. As has been shown, according to ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ, the role of the public is to support officials by loving your family, your life and your country. The decision to construct and perpetuate this distinction was not accidental. De Jonge reported from the set during filming that Sorkin instructed the characters to assert mastery of the facts. 60 It is a sad reflection on the dangers of talking in the ÔWar on TerrorÕ that have led me to anonymise these quotations, taken from interviews with ordinary American citizens conducted very shortly after 11 September 2001. All are available in the Witness and Response Collection at the Library of Congress and are respectively available on: SR375, September 13, 2001; SR375, September 13, 2001; SR381, September 15, 2001; SR381, September 15, 2001; SR085, September 20, 2001; SR276, September 20, 2001; SR376, September 19, 2001. 61 For example, Croft, Culture; Jackson, Writing.
ÔYou don't have to be so somber and funereal. It's not a wake ... You're smart. You know these things. Here they areÕ. 62 This demonstration of knowledge is important in the transition from the post 9-11 void to a situation whereby understandings of terrorism are increasingly homogenised across society through the construction of 9-11 as crisis.
Despite its scale, the shock it generated and its obvious significance for most Americans, 9-11 was not self-evidently a crisis. 63 To be constructed as a crisis, 9-11 relied upon a double articulation: the simultaneous identification of both the problem (the morbid underlying condition the events represented) and the solution. As Colin Hay has argued, crises rely upon a population being shown the solution to the impasse. 64 To be constructed as a crisis, 9-11 required a decisive intervention to be made, which articulated the events Ôas ÔsymptomÕ-atic of a more general condition of crisisÕ and a ÔWar on TerrorÕ, conducted through the agency of the American military led by President Bush, as the solution. 65 This Ôdecisive interventionÕ was essential to fill the void and respond to 9-11 as a crisis. 66 And it was a task aided and abetted by ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ.
Arguably, of course, all of this is nothing new. The rapid-fire and intelligent nature of the dialogue is part of the showÕs attraction for its fan base, and as Michelle Mouton argues The West Wing generally validates the Ôcodes, desires and aspirations of the educated professional classÕ. 67 Perhaps it should not be surprising that The West Wing helped to fill the post 9-11 void by amplifying dominant narratives and assisting in the construction of 9-11 as crisis. However, there have been important instances of The West Wing confronting and challenging dominant narratives to imagine alternative possible futures. 68 No better example of this exists than the prophetic seventh series, in which an overtly liberal, Hispanic candidate with soaring campaign rhetoric successfully overcomes the odds and expectations to win the presidential election. The character, Matt Santos (played by Jimmy Smits), was modelled on a young, liberal and little-known Senator. That Senator Ð Barack Obama Ð went on to win the realworld presidency in 2008, creating a strong sense of dŽjˆ vu for many who had watched The West Wing and cries that life was imitating art, imitating life. As this brief example and the preceding discussion highlight, entertainment television can both confirm and challenge; it has the potential to close down or open up space for debate in politics and society. And that is why ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ remains so disappointing, disturbing and dangerous.
Conclusion
In reaction to the more vitriolic criticism that was launched at ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ, Aaron Sorkin agreed that the episode might not have been The West Wing at its best but also by denying that it mattered or that it was even an episode of The West Wing at all.
ÔSome sort of respect had to be paid to the event that just happened ... We couldn't just do a regular 'West Wing.' I don't think that it was a good episode of 'The West Wing.' I don't think it was an episode of 'The West Wing.' I don't even know if it was good television. It was well intended, it was never meant to teach anything, to be preachyÕ. 69 Ô... the show had to bow its head somehow before it moved forwardÕ. 70 Executive Producer Thomas Schlamme confirms that the episode, inclusive of its limitations, was very much a product of that moment:
ÔWe can remember the absolute visceral feeling that we all had those two weeks after Sept. 11 --that episode was a product of those feelings. George W. Bush becoming president instead of Al Gore doesn't affect the show at all. But the pain of the nation and the pain that we all felt does affect the show a little bit. So it took awhile for us to find our sea legsÕ. 71 Similarly, this paper has argued that ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ was a product of the moment and also a powerful mechanism through which the moment was constructed in the terms set out by the Bush Administration. It helped to settle some of the unease that characterised American society, filling the void in meaning that followed the events in Pennsylvania, Virginia and New York. Having helped to establish 9-11 as crisis by reproducing emerging and increasingly dominant narratives, Sorkin has been adamant that NBC should not re-air the episode; it should remain something to be watched once and then locked away, never to be seen again.
And yet, of course, the episode can be purchased to view, standing outside of the usual sequence and storylines, again and again. The exceptionalism of 9-11 can be revisited, along with a purportedly Ôliberal responseÕ that reinforces dominant narratives, every time ÔIsaac and Ishmael is viewedÕ, out of continuity, by new and loyal viewers of The West Wing. Moreover, the narrowing performed by the foreign policy positions articulated and performed in ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ does not stand alone. Rather, as Gans-Boriskin and Tisinger have argued, the foreign policy of The West Wing was frequently Ômore hawkish than that of the Bush administrationÕ and these Ômessages matter; they matter in real and political waysÕ. 72 What Gans-Boriskin and Tisinger do not mention is that this was not always the case, but rather that, like many American politicians and citizens, The West Wing became more hawkish on foreign policy after the events of September 11 th 2001. Just as ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ was a product and important contributor to the political context of the post 9-11 moment, so other episodes are inevitably produced through the complex interactions of the showÕs directorÕs liberal leanings and the political circumstances of the time.
It is only necessary to consider the measured, unemotional arguments on foreign policy put forward in the showÕs third ever episode titled ÔA Proportional ResponseÕ to appreciate this transition. Here, President Bartlet is slowly led away from a desire to blow terrorists Ôoff the face of the earth with the fury of GodÕs own thunderÕ; he literally learns appropriate foreign policy behaviour based on Ôwhat our fatherÕs taught usÕ. After 9-11, as the Bush Administration constructed a new era, replete with new and unprecedented dangers, which required new strategies, The West Wing followed suit. Early calls for a Ôproportional responseÕ to terrorism stand in marked contrast to the plotlines that followed 9-11. It is apparent that the events of September 11 th had a dramatic impact on the show, the context in which the show aired, and on the broadly liberal views that informed plotlines. Initial, generally liberal, concerns with responding appropriately in line with a respect for precedent and international law rapidly lost favour after 9-11, as instead the show turned to consider the need to step outside of international law with plots advocating the political assassination of leaders allied with terrorists. Again, assisting the Bush Administration, The West Wing confirmed the exceptional nature of the post 9-11 world, in which a Ôwar paradigmÕ was required to keep us safe. In this paradigm, it was accepted as necessary that the law may have to be suspended to ensure security.
It is important that Political Scientists and International Relations take fictional dramas seriously. 73 They exert considerable influence in shaping public opinion and can help to derail or to reinforce the official policies of elected officials. They are also an important gauge, driver and reflector of Ôreal worldÕ political currents of thought. As ÔsofterÕ liberal arguments lost out in post 9-11 America to the Ôhard WilsonianÕ positions advocated by neoconservatives Ð famously described by Irving Kristol as liberals mugged by reality Ð The West Wing helped to imitate and initiate this crucial transition. As the official narratives and policy of the Bush Administration were put forward, The West Wing gave credence to the particular and contingent vision they offered, helping to contextualise the terror threat and naturalise the response they entailed for the American public. This was done by using established characters and a carefully crafted script to ensure that both BushÕs and BartletÕs ÔWar on TerrorÕ would resonate at home.
